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The goal of understanding in limnology 
Part of the charm of science is its unpredictability 
R. MacArthur 
Limnology has enjoyed a long tradition 
of progress based on thoughtful interpre- 
tation of empirical findings. New under- 
standing has grown in part from refining the 
details of known relationships but more 
often from uncovering interactions and pro- 
cesses that were previously unknown. The 
field is divided at present into camps which 
pursue the study of integral properties like 
biomass, productivity, and nutrient fluxes, 
and those which study the biological entities 
at the level of populations or communities. 
The conceptual dichotomy is a split be- 
tween primary attention to the laws of ther- 
modynamics or to the law of evolution by 
natural selection. Current challenges require 
steps to bridge this unfortunate gap and to 
broaden the conceptual bases of all ecolog- 
ical studies. 
In recent years ecologists have been pre- 
senting introspective examinations of their 
discipline at an alarming rate, as though 
practicing scientists need philosophical 
guidance (Platt 1964; Rigler 1975, 1982; 
May 1981; Paine 1981; Simberloff 1983; 
Andrewartha 1984). Readers are variously 
charged to follow prescribed methods of 
problem solving, to heed the apparently 
strong dichotomy between holism and re- 
ductionism, and sometimes to seek “pre- 
dictive power” rather than causality and 
derivation. The issues have reached prom- 
inent proportions in ecology within the past 
decade, but limnology was never immune 
from the debate. Evidently G. E. Hutchin- 
son unknowingly was stung by it during his 
tenure review when C. Juday argued that 
his theories about lake processes lacked the 
weight of real data tonnage (Hutchinson 
1979, p. 246-247). In the later years of their 
collaboration, Juday and E. A. Birge had 
developed an approach based on graphical 
correlation and rigid empiricism. They and 
their colleagues surveyed hundreds of lakes 
for properties like transparency, organic 
matter, and phosphorus. They then plotted 
them, either as frequency distributions or 
mean trend lines (e.g. Juday and Birge 193 1, 
1932; Juday et al. 1935) and voila-ex data 
venit veritas. The approach persists for 
practical reasons and it continues to be the 
most sensible way to categorize masses of 
data. 
What apparently got Hutchinson into hot 
water with some of the midwestern lim- 
nologists was his propensity to speculate and 
generalize beyond the data at hand. Years 
later the drive to comprehend empirical re- 
sults in a broad conceptual context prompt- 
ed one of his students to write “Scientists 
are perennially aware that it is best not to 
trust theory until it is confirmed by evi- 
dence. It is equally true . . . that it is best 
not to put too much faith in facts until they 
have been confirmed by theory” (Mac- 
Arthur 1972, p. 253). Data and empirical 
correlations carry more force with inquisi- 
tive minds when explanations or deri- 
vations put them in a logical context. Per- 
haps that is why when the works of Birge 
and Juday are inspected in hindsight, the 
men are regarded less for their massive sur- 
veys than for their struggles with defined 
problems (Mortimer 1956, p. 206). Their 
scientific biographer nonetheless remarks (p. 
198) “if the aim of limnology is the better 
understanding of the environmental control 
of living processes, it is a debatable point 
whether, for a given effort, more knowledge 
is to be gained by concentrating on a prob- 
lem selected for one lake or organism, or by 
the wider survey.” The data collected by 
those pioneer limnologists may yet achieve 
highest value in the hands of intellectual 
descendants who use them for temporal 
comparisons and investigations of environ- 
mental processes. 
Adherence to rigid empiricism in lim- 
nology continues today, but the technical 
sophistication of the approach has ad- 
vanced measurably. Today the trend lines 
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have been replaced with regression-based 
equations, and the visual impression of 
scatter is sharpened with statistical descrip- 
tions of estimation errors. Ever since Pion- 
telli and Tonolli (1964) proposed a rela- 
tionship between P-loading and retention of 
P in lake basins and Vollenweider (1969) 
modified the formula, there has been a 
succession of such equations. Inevitably as 
more and more data are produced, slopes, 
intercepts, or other parameters of the fitted 
model equations may change from the ones 
originally reported. Some of the changes may 
even be significant in a purely statistical 
sense. There remains a strong consensus in 
some quarters that these changes deserve 
broad dissemination because they mean that 
predictive capabilities have advanced. Often 
the improvement involves some model ad- 
justments caused by addition of new data 
or by nonlinear transformations of the old 
ones, but the key virtue is that “residual 
uncertainty,” in a statistical sense, is di- 
minished. These iterations contrast instruc- 
tively with the debates earlier in the century 
about the supposed heritability of IQ (Dorf- 
man 1978). Cyril Burt was able to print many 
“improved” versions of the same correla- 
tion plot and each improvement attracted 
wide attention. What seems likely is that 
each new version of the data was greeted 
with anticipation not because the slope had 
one particular value or another, but because 
the concept was contentious and intriguing. 
Readers wished to learn if the notion of her- 
itable intellectual capacity would be upheld 
or eroded by the new data. 
The IQ results had consequences for so- 
cial policy, and there are some parallels to- 
day in the application of limnological prin- 
ciples. I am often reminded by authors that 
“lake managers need to know” about an 
improved model fit, in order to predict the 
relation between P-loading and chlorophyll, 
for the public good. Often this is accom- 
panied by plain or shielded hype that “pre- 
dictive strength,” in a statistical sense, is 
the goal of science and that terms like “un- 
derstanding, ” “knowledge,” and “insight” 
are merely tautologies of prediction. The 
claims help to draw a distinction between 
sources of ecological knowledge and ave- 
nues of ecological understanding. Many 
aquatic scientists of this generation are jus- 
tifiably drawn to practical issues like pol- 
lution, water supply, and fisheries harvests. 
This audience is the proposed target bene- 
ficiary of empirical prescriptions and im- 
proved formulas. If these masses could be 
furnished with equations that forecast all 
biomass categories in lakes from one mea- 
surement of total P alone, the argument goes, 
that would be service indeed. Too often these 
recipients are caricatured with an appetite 
for empirical knowledge and with a will- 
ingness to forego understanding. It seems 
fairly obvious, however, that if we do not 
know why a particular relationship con- 
forms to the data, we cannot guess when it 
will fail or if the failure would be cata- 
strophic. It is not unreasonable to suspect 
that the noble goals of applied ecology will 
be best served by continued basic inquiries 
into process and mechanism. The practice 
of fitting data with novel equations persists 
in the arsenal of ecologists because some- 
times it opens paths of creative thought. 
Those thoughts and the understanding that 
may grow from them are what lead beyond 
the sterile exercise of numerical analysis to 
the substance that eventually fills the texts 
and review articles of the discipline. 
There are no prescriptions for progress in 
limnology or ecology, although progress can 
be stifled by restricting the limits of creative 
thought. Those who embrace constraints 
crafted by others in the form of Popperian 
or hypothetico-deductive straightjackets 
may have divined a means to restrict their 
imagination, but there is no evidence in my 
view that those constraints encourage 
breakthroughs in biological sciences. Even 
though Darwin presented his efforts as the 
product of one who had carefully mar- 
shalled the evidence, laid out all the pos- 
sibilities, and eliminated competing hy- 
potheses, his notes and correspondences 
reveal considerable reliance on induction 
and intuition (Gruber and Barrett 1974; May 
198 1; Bartholomew 1982). Biological sys- 
tems are characterized by nuances and com- 
plexities that trace to properties of organ- 
isms. Presence or absence of single species 
can make a difference to the organization 
of entire communities (Darwin 1859, Ch. 
3; Paine 1966). Sometimes even well 
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planned perturbations of biological systems 
produce astonishing results. 
The application of empirical equations to 
lake processes like eutrophication provides 
a good illustration of limitations in even this 
advanced and well respected endeavor. The 
model formulations do a good job of (sta- 
tistically) fitting the overall variability in 
data sets that include lakes all over the north 
temperate zone. This is supposed to be of 
great applied value. It seems to me that in 
most applications the supposed users of the 
models are interested in the response of a 
particular lake, rather than the average re- 
sponse of world lakes. When Southern In- 
dian Lake in northern Manitoba was ma- 
nipulated for a hydro development project, 
for instance, good scientists armed with em- 
pirical models predicted the future phos- 
phorus concentration by established pro- 
cedures (Hecky et al. 1984) and the 
predictions were probably very accurate, 
even though it will take years to find out. 
The actual ecosystem alterations involved 
fishery collapse, unacceptable mercury con- 
tamination, and excessive shoreline erosion 
(Newbury et al. 1984). These things were 
not predicted because the possibilities were 
not a part of the model. The only thing a 
statistical or mathematical model can do is 
make evident the full range of possibilities 
presented in a set of formal assumptions. 
We are not talking now about a single re- 
sponse variable that deviates from expec- 
tation, but rather about system properties 
that were never regarded as “response vari- 
ables” in the first place. A statistical model 
gives no clue where to look for the unex- 
pected result; yet it is from such results that 
understanding grows most rapidly in eco- 
logical sciences. 
Much of the growth in general ecological 
understanding comes from analog studies 
like the Southern Indian Lake example (Na- 
tional Research Council 1986). Before that 
work there were no comparable examples 
of responses by lake ecosystems to im- 
poundment in permafrost regions of glacio- 
lacustrine deposits. Perhaps some of the re- 
sults seem obvious in retrospect, but that 
in itself is a sure sign of improved under- 
standing. It is safe to assume that slight, 
albeit statistically significant, model adjust- 
ments could improve predictions of the long 
term steady state levels of chlorophyll in 
Southern Indian Lake in proportion to al- 
tered nutrient income, but these improve- 
ments are intellectually trivial compared to 
the other lessons learned from the project. 
In short, limnology is progressing not by 
improved “fits” to established relation- 
ships, but by the fits and starts of uncovering 
new processes and previously unknown re- 
lations. That is the work of intellectual pi- 
oneers, and judging from our history, pi- 
oneers instinctively shun restrictions 
imposed by others. 
What about the great body of “lake users” 
and “lake managers” who “need to know” 
the latest, best prescription for total P to 
biomass ratios or perhaps the best correlate 
for the square root of chlorophyll? The pur- 
suit of such empirical relationships causes 
no evident harm, and it is one of many good 
first steps in organization and thought. Many 
of the pursuits, however, are bound to be 
intellectual deadends. During World War 
II, I am told, the army wanted a way to 
predict whether a recruit could succeed in 
flight school. After sundry questionnaires 
and correlation studies, they concluded the 
best predictor was the recruit’s response to 
“Do you like Jello?” That sounds like the 
work of desperate men in desperate times, 
and maybe some lakes need the same he- 
roics. Ad hoc constructs can serve a pur- 
pose, but they provide little foundation for 
understanding. In a scientific discipline 
where publication is treated not as a reward 
for work accomplished, but as a stimulus 
for new thoughts, such constructs are 
doomed to eventual obscurity. 
What eventually replaces ad hoc empiri- 
cism are the results of work on general prin- 
ciples and discoveries of new ecosystem 
processes. Each natural or man-caused per- 
turbation to a lake is to some degree a novel 
experiment because no two lakes are iden- 
tical nor are weather and climate invariant. 
This is in part why individual lakes respond 
differently to changes in nutrient loading 
than one might guess from a regression as- 
sembled from many lakes (Smith and Sha- 
piro 198 1). Thankfully there are discernible 
trends in composite variables like total P 
concentration, chlorophyll, and Secchi 
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transparency, so that we may say “the av- 
erage lake will have more than 10 mg m-3 
Chl at this loading rate 60% of the time.” 
Composite variables are the fodder of 
regression-based comparative models. By 
dealing with total particulate P rather than 
plankton species abundances, an investi- 
gator has the chance to rely on established 
principles of mass balance, conservation 
laws, and even the law of large numbers. 
For instance, even though individual species 
may differ in their cellular ratios of C : N : 
P, if you add enough of them together, the 
mean must converge on some number. Per- 
haps that is why these investigators favor 
strict adherence to Baconian dogma, logical 
positivism, or null model worship. The more 
closely a field situation can be crafted to 
mimic controlled, replicable laboratory 
conditions, the more likely a defined set of 
possible outcomes can be enumerated and 
tested. In the world of the ecologist and lim- 
nologist, however, as G. E. Hutchinson has 
noted, an investigator “may spend his whole 
life falsifying hypotheses and in the end dis- 
cover he has learned nothing whatsoever 
about how the world actually works” 
(“Thoughts on Lake Benthos,” February 
1985, Ann Arbor). 
Biological systems depend on evolution 
by natural selection, and the outcomes of 
that process are not always logically pre- 
dictable in advance. It is hard to argue that 
most lake manipulations really promote 
evolution (to quote a creationist theme: 
“Sure, the plankton may migrate now, after 
the introduction of fish, but they are still 
just Daphnia; they didn’t change into any- 
thing better!“), but manipulations can cer- 
tainly lead to alternate communities con- 
structed from a larger potential species pool. 
Processes operating at these population 
levels can confound the predictions of com- 
posite-based models. For instance, the rise 
of Daphnia in Lake Washington (Edmond- 
son and Litt 1982) and Lake Michigan (Sca- 
via et al. 1986) caused major changes in 
water transparency and chlorophyll levels, 
despite negligible changes in nutrient load. 
It may be comforting to “lake managers” 
to learn that the changes are still embraced 
by the broad confidence limits of existing 
trophic regression models, but that just 
underlines an earlier point. Models can’t 
predict anything that wasn’t built into them 
from the start. Even the oft-cited “counter- 
intuitive result” is just the unrecognized 
consequence of the assumptions. 
An apparent companion to the growing 
fascination and success with composite 
variables is the use of cell size or particle 
size as a scaling property in trophic models 
(Steele and Frost 1977; Carpenter and 
Kitchell 1984). Because various features of 
cell metabolism vary empirically with size, 
there is some sense that size structure can 
be introduced into models in meaningful 
ways. After all, size is an observable prop- 
erty of living organisms. It seems a simple 
extension of existing approaches to take to- 
tal biomass or total particulate P and to 
apportion it among size classes. Then the 
dynamics of the size categories are esti- 
mated from sets of allometric relations. For 
instance, small particles are presumed to be 
grazed at faster rates than large ones, be- 
cause there is a wider array of grazers avail- 
able at small sizes, but small cells are also 
presumed to have higher maximum rates of 
growth. In short, an array of properties can 
be constructed that mimics the empirical 
observations that different size categories of 
the plankton wax and wane with time. There 
is even a tendency to generalize and say that 
large cells behave one way and small cells 
behave another. Often what is called a large 
cell is actually a colony or filament of small 
cells, but that doesn’t matter if size is the 
property of interest. 
The byproduct of this effort is the spawn- 
ing of a horde of sleuths armed with log-log 
equations in search of parameters that de- 
scribe all aspects of physiology and demog- 
raphy. The general trends in respiration, 
motility, and homeostatic costs with size are 
patently obvious and their elaboration fuels 
the quest. What lies ahead as a goal pre- 
sumably is a characterization of lake com- 
munities by size frequency distributions and 
further predictions of composite variables 
like productivity or fishery yield. This work, 
like the study of total P or chlorophyll is far 
enough removed from the genetical prop- 
erties of the biota to make it a plausible 
vehicle for engineering-type approaches. 
Perhaps empirical trends rely more on the 
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law of large numbers than on any laws of 
the living world. In a world where natural 
selection governs success, the game may in- 
clude fewer allometric rules than it includes 
risks, tricks, and tradeoffs. The extent to 
which an individual species conforms to 
empirical, size-based models in its life his- 
tory and growth strategies probably would 
not warrant applying these models at all. 
Biotic diversity represents the multiple re- 
sults of novel solutions to both old and new 
challenges. It takes more effort to interro- 
gate the real solutions crafted by real species, 
but the intellectual rewards of doing so are 
what have always drawn biologists to bi- 
ology. 
Enough writers have argued the inade- 
quacies of physical science analogs in the 
context of biological problem solving (e.g. 
Bartholomew 1982 and references therein) 
that reiteration is unnecessary. Biological 
systems are characterized by sets of several 
solutions to a problem, rather than by a 
single, general solution. Recognition of this 
fact, more than any other, stands in the way 
of using composite variables alone as ade- 
quate abstractions of biological properties. 
The variables are nonetheless vital for stud- 
ies of chemical properties and mass balance, 
so the cautionary note is in no way an in- 
dictment of their use. Sometimes, however, 
the draw of the physical sciences as a con- 
ceptual model for scientific thought is so 
strong that proponents explicitly ignore bi- 
ological processes or pretend that they are 
intractable (e.g. Rigler 1982). 
The growing recognition of individual 
physiological attributes of algae and their 
relation to ecological success represents a 
viable alternative to models based only on 
cell size, chlorophyll, or total phosphorus. 
Lakes supplied liberally with P and less with 
N eventually foster N,-fixing cyanobacteria, 
not because of cell size, but because of cell 
physiology and metabolic pathways. Simi- 
larly, when Si is plentiful, P limitation is 
evident from abundant proportions of Syn- 
edra or, if light is limiting and turbulence is 
great, by Melosira. Application of size- 
structure models has more potential among 
zooplankton than phytoplankton. Demo- 
graphic events like mortality caused by vi- 
sual-orienting planktivores, or by gape- 
limited invertebrate predators, are a 
demonstrable force in zooplankton com- 
munities. Among algae, however, it often 
seems that particular species prosper or de- 
cline not because they are large or small, but 
because they have some physiological at- 
tribute like obligate dependence on silicon, 
potential for N2 fixation, or extraordinary 
ability to exploit a single resource. It is also 
evident that conceptual refinements in this 
field are in a vigorous state of growth (Reyn- 
olds 1984; Sommer 1985) and that it is be- 
coming possible to characterize whole com- 
munities by attention to the properties of 
the organisms. 
What, then, is the role of understanding 
vis-a-vis prediction in ecological science? 
Predictions seem to fall into two major 
classes. The first is based on direct experi- 
ence. For instance, the phases of the moon 
can be predicted from the repetition of 
countless observations and from our innate 
conviction that past continua will endure. 
We don’t regard it a major intellectual 
achievement to predict the night of a full 
moon or the date of a spring tide. Predic- 
tions that are restatements of observable, 
repeatable facts are the common stuff of 
everyday life. When we produce a bivariate 
plot of chlorophyll vs. total P based on ex- 
tensive surveys, for instance, and then ex- 
pect a new data point to fall somewhere 
within the existing scatter, we are engaging 
in this sort of prediction. 
A different class of predictions arises from 
efforts to forecast the effects of manipula- 
tions. A well known maxim of field ecolo- 
gists is “you have to perturb the system to 
understand it.” Perhaps the perturbation in- 
volves nutrient addition, changes in hy- 
drology, or alteration of a food web. It may 
be purposeful or unintended; in ecological 
systems it is common for more than one 
factor to be manipulated simultaneously. 
Experience plays a role here, too, because 
often a prediction is assembled by reference 
to related or analog studies in which other 
systems were subjected to the same type of 
manipulation. Regardless of the reasoning 
path, and regardless of what system prop- 
erties are of-interest, an investigator must 
ask if the forecasted results make sense in 
the context at hand. That question is vital, 
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because it is the ultimate criterion of quality 
assurance that the investigator can use. 
Measurements can be biased, important 
variables overlooked or ignored, and cor- 
relations can arise for spurious or accidental 
reasons, so if results arise without conceiv- 
able mechanism it is wise to evaluate both 
data and theory. Above all, such predictions 
force us to regard the world as a set of ex- 
periments in progress -on a variety of scales 
and degrees of manipulation. As ecologists 
we get to discover the nature of the exper- 
iment designs and measure the outcomes. 
This requires a view of the systems as dy- 
namic entities, not as static ones. Static de- 
scriptions don’t lend themselves to predic- 
tions about perturbations, or to the 
understanding that they provide. 
Limnological understanding has grown 
remarkably since the time when Birge et al. 
(1927) fit “heat waves” to lake sediment 
temperatures and when Birge and Juday 
(1934) noted that the hydrologic renewal 
time of a lake “may have a more or less 
marked effect upon its productivity” (p. 
446). Part of the understanding grew from 
interrogating the empirical results and find- 
ing their cause, much as Mortimer (1965) 
interrogated empirical temperature vari- 
abilities in Lake Michigan and sorted out 
the dominant modes of oscillation. But just 
as much understanding has grown from rec- 
ognitions like those of HrbaCek et al. (196 1) 
and Brooks and Dodson (196 5) that species 
interactions mold communities in predict- 
able ways or that the appearance of Oscil- 
latoria rubescens ignals deteriorating water 
quality in many north temperate lakes (Ed- 
mondson et al. 1956). 
The challenge ahead seems to be in find- 
ing a way to align the dominant approaches 
of two schools of thought in limnology and 
oceanography. One group has focused on 
the thermodynamic constraints of mass bal- 
ance, conversion efficiencies, and so forth. 
This is a school that measures composite 
variables like productivity, biomass, and 
turnover rates. Another school bases its 
studies on genetical properties of organisms, 
with attention to birth rates, death rates, 
and individual adaptations. Too often these 
schools find each other’s efforts obtuse, un- 
interesting, or irrelevant. Both groups of sci- 
entists, however, are pursuing excellence by 
their own definitions of the term. Presum- 
ably the goals and standards of excellence 
will merge only if tools and concepts of one 
approach engender a sense of new under- 
standing across the discipline. Models based 
on composite variables are at a disadvan- 
tage in biological contexts because they can 
never address the fundamentally unique 
property of living entities, that of genetic 
integrity, so that the paradigms drawn from 
those models are intrinsically abiotic. New 
approaches based on integrating biological 
properties with community or food web dy- 
namics have barely been exploited, but they 
hold excellent prospects for launching a new 
round of growth in ecological understand- 
ing. One present challenge is to produce bi- 
ologically based representations which can 
satisfy the desires of some workers to pre- 
dict composite variables like size classes of 
particles. 
John T. Lehman 
Department of Biological Sciences and 
Great Lakes Research Division 
Natural Science Building 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor 48 109 
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